We adopt a systemic risk indicator measured by the price of insurance against systemic financial distress and assess individual banks' marginal contributions to the systemic risk. The methodology is applied using publicly available data to the 19 bank holding companies covered by the U.S. Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), with the systemic risk indicator peaking around $1.1 trillion in March 2009. Our systemic risk contribution measure shows interesting similarity to and divergence from the SCAP expected loss measure. In general, we find that a bank's contribution to the systemic risk is roughly linear in its default probability but highly nonlinear with respect to institution size and asset correlation. 
The recent global financial crisis has led bank supervisors and regulators to rethink the rationale of banking regulation. One important lesson is that the traditional approach to ensuring the soundness of individual banks, as in Basel I and Basel II, needs to be supplemented by a system-wide macroprudential approach. The macroprudential perspective of supervision focuses on the soundness of the banking system as a whole and the inter-linkages among those systemically important banks. This perspective has become an overwhelming theme in the policy deliberations among legislative committees, bank regulators, and academic researchers.
1 As stated in the Financial Stability Board's interim report in June 2010, "Financial institutions should be subject to requirements commensurate with the risks they pose to the financial system."
However, implementing such a macroprudential perspective is not an easy task. The operational framework needs to provide answers to three crucial questions. First, how should the systemic risk in a financial system be measured? Second, how should the contributions of individual banks (or financial institutions) to the systemic risk be measured? Third, how can prudential requirements on individual banks, such as capital surcharges, taxes, or fees for a financial stability fund, be designed so that they are connected with banks' systemic risk contributions?
Against such a background, this paper proposes a consistent framework that provides direct answers to the first two questions, the results of which can be used as helpful inputs to address the third question. Our systemic risk measure can be interpreted economically as the insurance premium to cover distressed losses in a banking system, which is a concept of a riskneutral market price, assuming that such an insurance market exists and functions properly (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009) . Within the same framework, the systemic importance of each bank (or bank group) can be properly defined as its marginal contribution to the hypothetical distress insurance premium (DIP) of the whole banking system. This approach allows us to study the time variation and cross section of the systemic risk contributions of U.S. large complex financial institutions (LCFIs). Our metric can be applied using only publicly available information for large banking organizations.
Adopting such a consistent approach has advantages. Under such a framework, the marginal contribution of each bank adds up to the aggregate systemic risk. As shown in Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009a) , this additivity property is desirable from an operational perspective because it allows the macroprudential tools to be implemented at individual bank levels. In particular, prudential requirements can be linear transformations of the marginal contribution measures if the measures are additive. One can also decompose our systemic risk measures into different economic channels-for example, risk premium versus actual default risk and credit risk versus liquidity risk. Finally, since our structural framework uses default probabilities, liability sizes, and correlations directly as inputs to capture the well publicized characteristics of systemic risk-leverage, too-big-to-fail, and tooconnected-to-fail-one can easily swap these inputs with supervisory confidential information for practical policy analysis.
We applied this approach to the 19 bank holding companies (BHCs) covered by the U.S.
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)-commonly known as the "stress test"-during the period from January 2004 to December 2009. However, unlike the SCAP, our analysis did not rely on any confidential, supervisory, or proprietary information or data.
Our findings suggest that the systemic risk indicator stood at its peak around $1.1 trillion in
March 2009 and has since fallen to about $300 billion-the level reached in January 2008. A bank's contribution to the systemic risk indicator appears to be linearly related to its default probability but highly nonlinear with respect to institution size and asset correlation. We find that the increase in systemic risk of the U.S. banking sector during the 2007-09 financial crisis was initially driven mainly by heightened default and liquidity risk premiums and later by the deterioration in actual default risk.
More important, we can rank the systemic importance of LCFIs in the U.S. banking sector. By our relative measure since the summer of 2007, Bank of America and Wells
Fargo's contributions to systemic risk have risen, JPMorgan Chase has seen some decreases, and Citigroup's share has remained the largest. The relative contributions to systemic risk from both consumer banks and regional banks seem to be increasing somewhat since 2009, possibly because of the worsening situations in the commercial real estate and consumer credit sectors, which typically lag the business cycles. Overall, our analysis suggests that size is the dominant factor in determining the relative importance of each bank's systemic risk contribution, but size does not change significantly over time, at least within a reporting quarter. The obvious time variations in the marginal contributions are driven mostly by the risk-neutral default probability and equity return correlation. In essence, the systemic importance of each institution is jointly determined by the size, default probability, and asset correlation of all institutions in the portfolio. Protection Act (U.S. Congress, 2010) imposes a limit on a bank's size, which is known as the Volcker concentration limit and aims at containing the systemic risk of individual banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology.
Section 3 introduces the data, and Section 4 presents empirical results based on an illustrative banking system that consists of 19 LCFIs in the United States. The last section concludes.
Methodology
This section describes the methodology used in the paper. The first part constructs a marketbased systemic risk indicator for a heterogeneous portfolio of financial institutions, and the second part designs a measure to assess the contribution of each bank (or each group of banks) to the systemic risk indicator.
Constructing the Systemic Risk Indicator
To construct a systemic risk indicator of a heterogeneous banking portfolio, we followed the structural approach of Vasicek (1991) for pricing the portfolio credit risk, which is also consistent with the Merton (1974) model for individual firm default. The systemic risk indicator, a hypothetical insurance premium against catastrophic losses in a banking system, was constructed from real-time publicly available financial market data (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009 ). The two key default risk factors, the probability of default (PD) of individual banks and the asset return correlations among banks, were estimated from CDS spreads and equity price co-movements, respectively.
Risk-Neutral Default Probability
The PD measure used in this approach was derived from single-name CDS spreads. A CDS contract offers protection against default losses of an underlying entity; in return, the protection buyer agrees to make constant periodic premium payments. The CDS market has grown rapidly in recent years, and the CDS spread is considered superior to the bond spread or loan spreads as a measure of credit risk.
2 The spread of a T -year CDS contract is given by
where R i,t is the recovery rate, r t is the default-free interest rate, and q i,t is the risk-neutral default intensity. The banks are indexed by i = 1, · · · , N. The above characterization assumes that recovery risk is independent of interest rate and default risks.
Under the simplifying assumptions of a flat term structure of the risk-free rate and a flat default intensity term structure, the one-year risk-neutral PDs of individual banks can be derived from CDS spreads, as in Duffie (1999) and Tarashev and Zhu (2008a) :
where a t ≡ t+T t e −rtτ dτ , b t ≡ t+T t τ e −rtτ dτ , and LGD i,t = (1−R i,t ) is the loss-given-default.
Three elements are in the implied PD estimated from the CDS market: (1) the compensation for expected default losses; (2) the default risk premium for bearing the default risk;
and (3) other premium components, such as liquidity or uncertainty risk compensations.
Our systemic risk indicator incorporates the combined effects of these three elements on the price of insurance against distressed losses in the banking system.
One extension in this study is that we allowed for the LGD to vary, rather than assuming it to be a constant, over time.
3 For example, Altman and Kishore (1996) showed that the LGD can vary over the credit cycle. To reflect the co-movement in the PD and LGD parameters, we chose to use expected LGDs as reported by market participants who price and trade the CDS contracts.
Asset Return Correlation
Systemic risk in a financial sector is in essence a joint default event of multiple large institutions, which is captured by the correlations of observable equity returns (Nicolò and Kwast, 2002 ). At a more fundamental level, such a correlation structure may be driven by the common movements in underlying firms' asset dynamics (Vasicek, 1991) . We measured the asset return correlation by the equity return correlation (Hull and White, 2004) , as the equity market is the most liquid financial market and can incorporate new information on an institution's default risk in a timely way. The standard approach is to use the so-called historical correlation, which is based on the past year of daily return data.
Let ρ i,j denote the correlation between banks' asset returns A i,t and A j,t , which is approximated by the correlation between banks' equity returns, with i and j ∈ {1, · · · , N} and N as the number of banks. To ensure the internal consistency of correlation estimates, we assumed that asset returns are underpinned by F common factors
and N idiosyncratic factors Z i,t (Gordy, 2003) :
where
] is the vector of common factor loadings,
Without loss of generality, all common and idiosyncratic factors were assumed to be mutually independent and to have zero means and unit variances.
We estimated the loading coefficients β i,f (i = 1, · · · , N, f = 1, · · · , F ) by minimizing the mean squared difference between the target correlations and the factor-driven correlations:
In practice, three common factors can explain up to 95 percent of the total variation in our correlation sample estimates. More important, besides the "zero mean, unit variance" normalization, this estimation method imposes no restriction on the distribution of the common and idiosyncratic factors.
Hypothetical Distress Insurance Premium
Based on the inputs of the key credit risk parameters-PDs, LGDs, correlations, and liability weights-the systemic risk indicator can be calculated by simulation as described in Gibson (2004) , Hull and White (2004) , and Tarashev and Zhu (2008b) . In short, to compute the indicator, we first constructed a hypothetical debt portfolio that consisted of the total liabilities (deposits, debts, and others) of all banks. The indicator of systemic risk, effectively weighted by the liability size of each bank, is defined as the insurance premium that protects against the distressed losses of this portfolio. Technically, it is calculated as the risk-neutral expectation of portfolio credit losses that equal or exceed a minimum share of the sector's total liabilities.
To be more specific, let L i denote the loss of bank i's liability with
L i is the total loss of the portfolio. Then the systemic risk of the banking sector, or the distress insurance premium (DIP), is given by the risk-neutral expectation of the loss exceeding a certain threshold level:
where L min is a minimum loss threshold or "deductible" value. The DIP formula can be easily implemented with Monte Carlo simulation (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009) .
Notice that the definition of this DIP is very close to the concept of expected shortfall (ES) used in the literature (see, e.g., Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2010) in that both refer to the conditional expectations of portfolio credit losses under extreme conditions. They differ slightly in the sense that the extreme condition is defined by the percentile distribution in the case of ES but by a given threshold loss of the underlying portfolio in the case of DIP. Also, the probabilities in the tail event underpinning ES are normalized to sum to 1; these probabilities are not normalized for DIP. The value-at-risk measure, or VaR-extended by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) 
Identifying Systemically Important Banks
For the purpose of macroprudential regulation, it is important not only to monitor the level of systemic risk for the banking sector but also to understand the sources of risks in the financial system, i.e., to measure the marginal contributions of each institution. This information is especially useful considering the reform effort of the financial regulations across the globe, with the main objective of charging additional capital for systemically important banks and supporting a resolution regime for these banks. In the following paragraphs, we propose a method to decompose the credit risk of the portfolio into the sources of risk contributions associated with individual subportfolios (either a bank or a group of banks).
Following Kurth and Tasche (2003) and Glasserman (2005) , for standard measures of risk, including VaR, ES, and the DIP used in this study, the total risk can be usefully decomposed into a sum of marginal risk contributions. Each marginal risk contribution is the expected loss from that subportfolio, conditional on a large loss for the full portfolio. In particular, if we define L as the loss variable for the whole portfolio and L i as the loss variable for a subportfolio, the marginal contribution to our systemic risk indicator, the DIP, can be characterized by
The additivity property of the decomposition results-i.e., the fact that the systemic risk of a portfolio equals the marginal contribution from each subportfolio-is extremely important from an operational perspective. Whereas the macroprudential approach focuses on the risk of the financial system as a whole, in the end regulatory and policy measures are introduced at the level of individual banks. Our approach, therefore, allows a systemic risk regulator to easily link the regulatory capital assessment with risk contributions from each institution.
A technical difficulty is that systemic distresses are rare events; and thus ordinary Monte
Carlo estimation is impractical for the purpose of calculation. Therefore, to improve the efficiency and precision, we relied on the importance-sampling method developed by Glassmerman and Li (2005) for simulating portfolio credit losses. For the 19-bank portfolio in our sample, we used the mean-shifting method and generated 200,000 importance-sampling simulations of default scenarios (default or not), 6 and for each scenario we generated 100 simulations of LGDs. 7 Based on these simulation results, we calculated the expected loss of each subportfolio conditional on the total loss exceeding a given threshold.
Alternative Approaches
The body of literature on systemic risk measurement and management is rapidly growing; some researchers are focusing on the interaction between the real economy and the financial sector (see, e.g., Nicolò and Lucchetta, 2010) , and others on financial sector default risk (see, e.g., Kim and Giesecke, 2010) . Three approaches are closely related to ours in terms of focusing on identifying systemically important institutions and charging additional capital based on banks' marginal contributions.
8
The most closely related approach is the CoVaR method proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) . CoVaR looks at the VaR of the whole portfolio conditional on the VaR of an individual institution, defined implicitly as
where the expectation is taken under the objective measure. In other words, the focus of CoVaR is to examine the spillover or correlation effect from one bank's failure on the whole system, but CoVaR underplays the importance of institutional size by design. By comparison, our definition of DIP is along the same lines, but DIP focuses on the loss of a particular bank (or bank group) conditional on the system being in distress. 9 Nevertheless, a major disadvantage of CoVaR is that it can be used only to identify systemically important institutions but cannot appropriately aggregate the systemic risk contributions of individual institutions.
10
Another alternative is the MES proposed by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) . MES looks at the expected loss of each bank conditional on the whole portfolio of banks performing poorly:
where the expectation is taken under the objective measure. Again, in comparison, MES is similar to our DIP measure in that both focus on each bank's potential loss conditional on the system being in distress exceeding a threshold level, and both are coherent risk measures.
They differ slightly in the sense that the extreme condition is defined by the percentile distribution in the MES setting but by a given threshold loss of the underlying portfolio in the case of DIP. Also, the probabilities in the tail event underpinning MES are normalized to sum to 1; these probabilities are not normalized for DIP. The more important difference is that MES is calculated based on equity return data, while our DIP measure is based mainly on the CDS data. Compared with equity return data, CDS data are better and purer sources of default risk information.
A third alternative is the "Shapley value" decomposition approach by Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009a,b) , which focuses on how to allocate among individual institutions any appropriately defined notion of systemic risk. The Shapley value approach, constructed in game theory, defines the contribution of each bank as a weighted average of its add-on effect to each subsystem that includes this bank. The Shapley value approach derives systemic importance at a different level from our approach. Under its general application, the Shapley value approach tends to suffer from the curse of dimensionality problem in that, for a system of N banks, there are 2 N possible subsystems for which the systemic risk indicator needs to be calculated. 11 However, the Shapley value approach has the same desirable additivity property and therefore can be used as a general approach for allocating systemic risk.
Data
We applied the methodology outlined previously, which relies only on publicly available data, to the 19 bank holding companies default events during our sample period. In addition, whereas we allowed for time-varying recovery rates, they exhibited only small variation (between 33 and 40 percent) during the sample period.
13

Empirical Findings
We applied the methodology described in Section 2 and examined the systemic risk in the U.S. banking system consisting of 19 banks covered by the SCAP, commonly known as the "stress test." Using these banks as an example, we first reported the systemic risk indicator for these institutions as a group and then analyzed the systemic importance of individual banks.
13 The original recovery rate data had a significant sparseness problem in that a large portion of CDS quotes came without the corresponding recovery rates. Therefore, in this paper, we applied a HodrickPrescott (HP) filter to the recovery data and used the HP-filtered recovery rates to reflect the time variation in recovery rates and, at the same time, to avoid noisy movements in average recovery rates due to data reporting problems. PDs is a dominant factor in determining the level of the systemic risk indicator, explaining on it own 94 percent of the variation in the DIP. On average, an increase of 1 percentage point in the average PD raises the DIP by 1.7 percent. The level of correlation also matters but to a lesser degree, and its effect is largely washed out once PD is included. This result is perhaps due to the fact that PD and correlation moved closely for the sample banking group during this special period, with a sample correlation coefficient of 0.66. In addition, the recovery rate has the expected negative sign in the regression, as higher recovery rates reduce the ultimate losses for a given default scenario. Interestingly, the dispersion in PDs across the 19 banks has a significantly negative effect on the systemic risk indicator.
Systemic Risk Indicator
14 This outcome partly supports our view that incorporating heterogeneity in PDs is important in measuring the system risk indicator.
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The results have two important implications. First, given the predominant role of average PDs in determining the systemic risk indicator, a first-order approximation of the systemic risk indicator could use the weighted average of PDs (or CDS spreads). This implication can be confirmed by comparing the similar trends in average PDs (the top panel in Figure   1 ) and the DIP (Figure 2) . Second, the average PD itself is only a good approximation but is not sufficient in reflecting the intricate nonlinear relationship between the systemic risk indicator and its input variables. Correlations and heterogeneity in the PD also matter. In other words, diversification can reduce the systemic risk.
Risk Premium Decomposition
As mentioned in Section 2, the PDs implied from CDS spreads are a risk-neutral measure and include information on not only the expected actual default losses of the banking system but 14 Dispersion is represented as the standard deviation of the variable of interest for the sample banks at each particular point in time. The correlation coefficient for a particular bank is defined as the average pairwise correlation between this bank and other banks.
15 In a study of 22 Asia-Pacific banks (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2010) , we found that the heterogeneities in both PDs and correlations significantly reduce the systemic risk, which is consistent with the fact that Asia-Pacific banks are much more diverse than their U.S. counterparts. also the default risk premium and liquidity risk premium components. It has been argued that, during the crisis period, the risk premium component could be the dominant factor in determining CDS spreads (see, e.g., Kim, Loretan, and Remolona, 2009) . Given that the systemic risk indicator is based on risk-neutral measures, an interesting question is how much of its movement is attributable to the change in the "pure" credit quality (or actual potential default loss) of the banks and how much is driven by market sentiments (change in risk attitude, market panic, and so on) or a liquidity shortage.
We ran a regression analysis that examined the effect of actual default rates and risk premium factors on the systemic risk indicator. In Table 3 , objective default risk (or actual default rates) is measured by average expected default frequencies (EDFs) of sample banks, the default risk premium in the global market is proxied by the difference between spreads on corporate bonds rated Baa and Aaa (see, e.g., Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2008) , and the liquidity risk premium is proxied by the spread of London interbank offered rates, or LIBOR, over the overnight index swap rate, or OIS (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009 ). Individually (regressions 1 to 3), each of the three factors has a significant effect on the systemic risk indicator, with an expected positive sign. In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in the real default probability, default risk premium, and liquidity risk premium will translate into 1.93, 3.07, and 2.52 percentage point increases, respectively, in the systemic risk indicator.
The default or credit risk premium has the highest univariate R-square of 76 percent. The last regression includes all three factors, which remain statistically significant, and jointly these driving factors seem to explain 87 percent of aggregate systemic risk variations. 
Marginal Contribution to Systemic Risk
The most relevant question is, what are the sources of vulnerabilities? In other words, which banks are systemically more important or contribute the most to the increased vulnerability?
Our identification of systemically important institutions can be contrasted with other marketbased systemic risk measures (e.g., CoVaR and MES) and with confidential supervisory information (e.g., the SCAP result). In addition, our measures of institutions' systemic importance change noticeably over time, especially during the financial crisis, and as such can provide important monitoring tools for the market-based macroprudential or financial stability regulation.
Using the methodology described in Section 2, we calculated the marginal contributions Table 5 examines the determinants of the marginal contribution to the systemic risk indicator for each bank, using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on the panel data.
To control for bias, we used clustered standard errors grouped by banks as suggested by Peterson (2009) . The first regression shows that the weight, or the size effect, is the primary factor in determining marginal contributions both in level terms and in relative terms. This result is not surprising given the conventional "too-big-to-fail" concern and the fact that bigger banks often have stronger interlinkage with the rest of the banking system. Default probabilities also matter but to a lesser extent, and the significance almost disappears in the relative-term regression. The sample correlation between the marginal contribution and individual PDs in the level is 0.277, and in the relative term is only 0.027. In comparison to the results in Table 2 , we can see that weighted PD is a good first-order proxy for systemic risk, but individual PDs are not first-order proxy for systemic risk contributions, because correlations and other factors matter. The regressions in Table 5 show that correlation is an important determinant of systemic risk contributions, both by itself (regression 1) and by interactive terms (regression 3). The coefficients are statistically significant in level regressions, and to a lesser extent in relative-term regressions. The second and third regressions also suggest that there are significant interactive effects between size and PD or correlation, which have additional and significant explanatory power.
The above findings support the case for distinguishing between microprudential and macroprudential perspectives of banking regulation: the failure of individual banks does not necessarily contribute to the increase in systemic risk. Size, correlation and the interactions between the determinants play important roles. Overall, the results suggest that the marginal contribution is the highest for high-weight (hence large) banks that observe increases in PDs or correlations.
The nonlinear effect documented in Table 5 is more visible in a hypothetical calibration exercise examining the relationship between our systemic risk indicator and an institution's size (total liability), (risk-neutral) default probability, and (average) historical correlation ( Figure 6 ).
17 The relationship looks roughly linear for default probability but highly nonlinear with respect to size and, to a lesser degree, correlation. In fact, when the bank size is below 10 percent of the total portfolio, the slope of the systemic importance with respect to size is very flat; but when the size is beyond 10 percent, the contribution to systemic risk shoots up almost vertically. An intuitive reason is that, when a bank is too big, its failure is considered a systemic failure by definition. This consideration may indicate a desirable maximum size of the large complex financial institutions, which, by limiting the systemic risk, could provide a societal benefit. The relationship between systemic importance and correlation shows a similar nonlinear pattern but is less dramatic. In other words, systemic importance is a joint effect of an institution's size, leverage, and concentration and is highly nonlinear.
Our finding of the dominant effect of bank size and its pronounced nonlinear effect on a bank's systemic risk contribution has important policy implications. In particular, the financial regulation reform bill recently enacted by the U.S. Congress (2010) 
Alternative Systemic Risk Measures
As discussed earlier in Section 2, our marginal contribution measure is an alternative measure related to the CoVaR measure suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) and the MES measure suggested by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) . The most important difference is that our DIP-based measure of each bank's systemic importance is a risk-neutral pricing measure that is derived from both CDS and equity market data, while CoVaR and MES are objective distribution-based statistical measures that rely only on equity return information. Another important difference is that DIP and MES measure each bank's loss conditional on the system being in distress, while CoVaR measures the system losses conditional on each bank being in distress. Finally, both CoVaR and MES only implicitly take into account of the size, PD, and correlation of each bank, while for our DIP measure, these characteristics are direct inputs into our systemic risk indicator. 
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Note that our systemic risk measure is a risk-neutral concept, while SCAP and MES are based on statistical expected loss; consequently MES is supposed to have a stronger connection with SCAP than with DIP. Although CoVaR is also a statistical measure, it measures the system's loss conditional on each bank being in distress, while MES and DIP measure each bank's loss conditional on the system being in distress, yet SCAP measures each bank's loss conditional on the macroeconomy in stress. Also, the tail percentile value (like CoVaR) and tail expected value (like MES or SCAP) can diverge significantly in heavy-tailed distributions. These differences in conditioning directions and tail measures may explain the notable differences in the rankings of DIP, MES, and CoVaR versus those of SCAP.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper, we advocate a methodology to measure the systemic importance of individual banks and their marginal contributions to a distressed insurance premium that relies only on publicly available information. We applied this methodology to the 19 banks covered by the SCAP, or stress test program. Our results suggest that the elevated systemic risk in the banking sector is driven initially by the rising default risk premium and later by the heightened liquidity risk premium. But after the fourth quarter of 2008, both real default risk and risk premiums were rising as the financial crisis turned into a severe economic recession.
A decomposition analysis shows that the marginal contributions of individual banks to the systemic risk indicator are determined mostly by bank size, consistent with the "too-big-tofail" doctrine, although correlation and default probability also matter. Finally, our measure 19 We obtained the MES data from the New York University Stern Volatility Lab at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk, and the CoVaR data were kindly provided by Tobias Adrian. We flipped the signs of CoVaR measures so that the higher the CoVaR, the more the bank contributes to the systemic risk. This approach is consistent with other measures in the comparative study.
20 The ex post weighting of the MES and CoVaR measures by size can raise a question about how to interpret the resulting absolute magnitudes. As shown by the y-axes in Figure 5 , the tier-1-capital-weighted MES has a scale of $6 billion, and CoVaR, translated to dollar terms, has a scale of $2 trillion. In comparison, both SCAP and DIP extend to $150 billion.
of the systemic importance of banks-as a market-based risk-neutral price-shows a clear association with and interesting difference from the estimated SCAP loss as an objective statistical measure.
Our results have several important policy implications. First, our analysis provides useful inputs for the ongoing discussion of the imposition of capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The 2007-09 global financial crisis has led the international community of supervisors and regulators to reform the regulatory framework to ensure that a crisis on this scale never happens again (Financial Stability Board, 2010a) . As an important part of the global initiatives, there is a general consensus that SIFIs need to set aside an additional capital buffer (Financial Stability Board, 2010b) . In practice, Swiss regulator announced a plan to impose total capital requirements as high as 19% on the two largest Swiss banks, among which 6 percentage points are systemic surcharges. Similarly, the Chinese regulator imposed a minimum capital adequate ratio of 11.5% for large banks, in contrast to 10% for small and medium-sized banks.
However, it is still highly debatable regarding the definition of SIFIs and the calculation of capital surcharge for SIFIs. In this paper, we show that the systemic importance of financial institutions depends on their size, correlation and PD, which is highly consistent with the shared views among regulators and supervisors (IMF-BIS-FSB, 2009 ). More importantly, the additive property of our systemic risk contributions, as discussed in Section 2.2, makes it feasible to directly map our measures into capital surcharges. Preliminary analysis shows a high correlation between our systemic importance measures and the capital infusion into the banking system by the US government in 2008-09. Further analysis is necessary to make the mapping of our systemic risk contributions into capital surcharges more rigorous.
Second, although the proposed DIP measure is risk neutral, the framework can be easily extended by replacing key inputs with the regulator's confidential information or other input variables for the purpose of policy analysis. For instance, one can replace the risk-neutral PDs in our framework with objective measures of PDs and calculate the DIP on an incurred-cost basis.
21 This objective measure, by filtering out the risk premium components, can provide 21 The EDF is one such product that produces objective measures of the expected default rates of in-useful complimentary information for supervisors.
Third, our systemic risk indicator is designed as a real-time signal of the systemic risk in a banking system, and cannot be interpreted directly as an early warning indicator. Indeed, the DIP measure was low in 2007 and went up rapidly alongside the deepening of the crisis.
However, our measure has the potential to be used in early warning exercises. One way is to use the above-mentioned decomposition analysis to examine to what degree the DIP can be explained by the actual default risk versus the risk premium component. Very likely, at the inception of a crisis, a market-based systemic risk indicator (such as DIP) tends to be low because it is mainly driven by unusually low level of risk premia. So users should be careful in interpreting the results. The other way is to incorporate our measure into an early warning system, such as in the stress testing exercise as illustrated in Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) .
dividual firms. However, it is widely acknowledged that EDFs for financial firms are less reliable, mainly because financial firms typically have much higher leverages than corporate firms. The higher leverage does not necessarily reflect higher default risk but will cause substantial bias in EDF estimates without proper adjustment, which remains a challenging task. Notes: The dependent variable is the marginal contribution of each bank to the systemic risk indicator, which is represented in level terms (unit cost of insurance, in basis point) in the first panel and in relative terms (as a percentage of total insurance premium) in the second panel. Explanatory variables include PDs, bank-specific correlations (average of pairwise correlations between one bank and all others) and weights of individual banks and interactive terms. Similarly, PDs and correlations refer to level terms in the first panel and relative terms (the ratio over cross-sectional averages) in the second panel. OLS regression is adopted and t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis, using clustered standard errors grouped by banks. Notes: This graph compares three systemic risk measures, distressed insurance premium (DIP) proposed by this paper, marginal expected shortfall (MES by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2010) weighted by bank's tier-1 capital, and conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009) 
